Bad to Good… Even Great?
Article by Dr. John E. Kello
Readers familiar with the work of prominent leadership expert Jim Collins will catch the reference in the title of this column. Among other lines of organizational research, Collins studied and wrote about companies that were “OK” for a long period of time, and then had a surge period wherein they achieved a dramatic increase in stock value and overall performance excellence. Thus, such companies went from “Good to Great”.
What about organizations that are not very good? Are they doomed to underperform and even fail, or can they possibly go from “Bad to Good… Even Great”?
Looking specifically at safety performance, consider the following situation, a composite case study from the realm of EHS, but a realistic and, sadly, common one in my experience:
An organization has a “fair” safety record on paper, and has in its offices and factories many posted banners declaring that “Safety is Job 1” and “X days without an accident”, but its safety systems and processes are not very good. The organization has one top-level safety engineer, who spends very little time in the field operations of the company, and who in fact does not have a safety background per se. Some of the field operations have a safety committee, while others do not. The safety committees that do exist are not given much corporate direction or resourcing, and they are generally vague about their mission. Employees in some of the locations are not even sure whether they are still on the safety committee, as it rarely if ever meets. Some are even unsure whether there is a functioning safety committee at their shop.
There are quarterly safety meetings, which are usually centered mainly or exclusively on safety training, OSHA-mandated or otherwise. There is a safety incentive program that pays for no LTAs and no-more-than-X OSHA recordables. There is a near-miss program that requires that each employee submit a specified number of near-misses in writing per quarter.
Again, the measurable safety record of the hypothetical organization in question is “not bad” just now. In terms of their current safety programs, “good enough” seems to be good enough. After all, they are not having many accidents… right?
But the company is “driving around without a spare”. Their safety process is, frankly, pretty bad.
Employees will confidentially tell an inquisitive consultant that incidents sometimes go unreported, and that other equally problematic transgressions occur, in order for the employees to keep their safety bonus. The near-miss reporting “requirement” has devolved into a numbers game (“come up with two, whether they are real or not, and you are OK”); there’s not much near-miss learning going on.
And then the site with “the best safety record” in the company suffers a catastrophic reportable event.
How does a company with a “bad” safety process go to good, even great?
From my experience, while there may be no guaranteed, sure-fire formula, there are highly effective strategies. Such strategies for success include the following prescriptions:
It has to start from the top. Top Management at the corporate and site levels must be visibly supportive of safe work, no exceptions. The expression may be over-used (so be it), but leaders have to “walk the talk”. Especially in work environments where there has been mistrust of management, and/or where there have been flavor-of-the-month programs, there has to be unequivocal, visible commitment from leadership at the top. In the false dichotomy of “safety or productivity”, if put in those terms, the answer has to be safety.
It has to involve “both sides of the house”. In union environments, union leaders (as well as rank-and-file employees) must be actively partnered with management in support of the safety process.
It has to be sustained. Whatever “programs” may be put in place, leadership has to be disciplined enough to stay the course, and work with those programs and get their benefits. Psychologists (aided and abetted by common sense in this case) will tell you that it is easier to start a new program than it is to stay with and work on an old one. The temptation is to jump to the next great program (see comment above re flavor of the month).
It has to be ultimately owned by each and every employee. Safety can’t be the responsibility of a safety engineer or a safety committee alone. It has to be a shared accountability on the part of all employees.
It has to be supported by effective training. Employees must know what to watch out for, and how to communicate with peers in constructive, professional ways, to identify and correct hazards, and to stop unsafe acts and redirect risky behavior to “best practice”.
It has to focus also on capturing and learning from the real near misses that inevitably occur.
It has to focus also on making safety meetings (and other safety communications) effective as activators of mindfulness and safe acts.
It has to continue to focus on working conditions and person factors (e.g., lack of training, fatigue, stress), as well as behavior.
It has to be driven by a Vision. At the most general level, a meaningful Vision of the Positive Safety Culture must be created and used to align internal efforts to keep all associates safe.
It has to have visible, energetic “champions”. Such individuals are managers or informal leaders that others pay attention to. These champions inspire followership, and help to create a broader coalition of safety leaders, eventually expanding to all employees. They are catalysts, sparkplugs, energizers of the effort. While all need to be engaged (see point #4 above), there must be go-to champions who drive the effort passionately and relentlessly and remove barriers in order to help create and sustain that total engagement.
The sum total of the above is a Positive Safety Culture, where safety is a non-negotiable core value embraced by all employees, and where associates at all levels own responsibility for coaching and watching out for each other (as well as themselves) and ensuring that work is done safely.
None of the foregoing should be taken to suggest that the transition from bad to good to great is easy or quick. Most change processes are challenging, even when the outcome is obviously positive and highly desired. But I would insist that creating sub-systems that support each of the above prescriptive strategies can make it work. Organizations with excellent safety processes, and results to match, embrace those strategies.